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Pennsylvania's Treatment of Children
Who Commit Murder: Criminal
Punishment Has Not Replaced Parens
Patriae
I. Introduction
The debate over whether to treat children who commit murder as
juveniles or adults recently resurfaced in Pennsylvania with the plight
of Cameron Kocher.' Kocher, an intelligent fourth grader and Cub
Scout,2 was only nine years old when he was charged with murder in
the shooting death of seven-year-old Jessica Ann Carr.3  Kocher
confessed to psychiatrists that he had been playing hunter when the gun
went off, but that he had not seen the girl in the scope.4 Kocher was
arrested and charged with criminal homicide in a court of common
pleas.5 The trial court denied the child's request for a transfer of the
matter to juvenile court6 because it determined that Kocher was not
amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation in the juvenile
system.' In early 1992, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the court of common pleas had abused its discretion in denying
Kocher's petition for a transfer to juvenile court.! The trial court's
order was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.9
1. See Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308 (Pa. 1992) (plurality opinion).
2. Henry J. Reske, A Childhood Tragedy Vexes Courts, A.B.A. J., May 1992, at 32.
3. Kocher, 602 A.2d at 1309-10. On March 6, 1989, Kocher was home from school
because of a snow holiday. Id. at 1309. After playing Nintendo with friends next door, Kocher
went home, and the other children, including Jessica Ann Carr, began riding snowmobiles. Id.
At home, Kocher procured the key to his father's locked gun cabinet and removed a hunting rifle
equipped with a scope. Id. He loaded the rifle, opened a window, removed the screen, and
pointed the gun toward where the other children were playing. Id. The gun discharged, and
Jessica Ann Carr was fatally wounded. Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308, 1309-10 (Pa.
1992).
4. Reske, supra note 2.
5. Kocher, 602 A.2d at 1310.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1313. Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act gives courts of common pleas the discretion to
transfer murder cases to juvenile court when the defendant is a child. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
6322(a) (1990).
8. Kocher, 602 A.2d at 1315. Among other things, the supreme court concluded that the
trial court erred in making transfer contingent upon proof that some underlying mental disease or
disorder had prompted the killing. Id. Although this plurality opinion is not binding precedent
for Pennsylvania courts, Commonwealth v. Shoop, 617 A.2d 351, 353 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992),
it may still influence future decisions concerning Pennsylvania's treatment of children who commit
murder.
9. Kocher, 602 A.2d at 1315. In September 1992, Cameron Kocher pled no contest to
involuntary manslaughter in a plea bargain that will keep him on probation until he turns twenty-
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Disagreement regarding the appropriate treatment of children who
commit murder is rooted in the philosophical differences between
criminal and juvenile law. Criminal law emphasizes the prevention of
anti-social conduct through the punishment of those who commit
crimes.'0  In contrast, juvenile law disavows punishment and
emphasizes treatment, supervision and rehabilitation as methods to
prevent juvenile crime."' These fundamental differences affect judicial
decisions on the matter 2 and have a profound effect on an accused
child's future.
This Comment addresses Pennsylvania's treatment of children who
commit murder. Part II discusses the evolution of Pennsylvania's
juvenile laws. It will show how a philosophy of parens patriae3
developed as the underlying foundation for the Commonwealth's
juvenile justice system, even when dealing with children accused of
murder. Part III analyzes the impact of four Supreme Court decisions
that signaled a shift away from the parens patriae philosophy and
toward the criminalization ofjuvenile court proceedings. Part IV of this
Comment analyzes Pennsylvania's current juvenile laws. While parens
patriae continues to be the underlying philosophy of the Juvenile Act,
the Act recognizes that some children who commit murder should
properly be tried in adult criminal courts. Part V of this Comment
discusses the trend in other jurisdictions toward criminalizing juvenile
courts and considers the way in which Pennsylvania courts should, in
the future, treat children who commit murder.
one. Probation Ends Shooting Case, THE SENTINEL (Carlisle, PA), Sept. 3, 1992, at A2. The plea
bargain finally resolved a case that had been stalled for several years while the boy's status as
either a juvenile or an adult was debated in the courts. Id.
10. See Leonard Packel, A Guide to Pennsylvania Delinquency Law, 21 VILL. L. REV. 1, 1
(1975) (reviewing the historical development of delinquency law in Pennsylvania and analyzing
the Juvenile Act of 1972).
I1. Id.
12. Both philosophies colored the opinions written in Kocher. In his concurrence, Justice
Flaherty wrote that "the public policy of Pennsylvania does not allow the criminal prosecution of
a nine-year-old child for murder. That it was attempted in this case shocks my conscience." Id.
at 1315 (Flaherty, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Larsen stated that "[t]his nine-year-old
defendant is not an innocent victim of the tragic instances of accidental shootings occurring in
homes where firearms are handled carelessly. . . . The victim, whom the majority seems to forget
ever existed, was killed by a bullet deliberately aimed and shot through her back, as she was riding
as a passenger on a snowmobile." Id. at 1316 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
13. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country" and refers to the principle that the
state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, including minors who lack proper
care and custody from their parents. BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). The term
parens patriae originated in the English common law when the king had a royal prerogative to act
as guardian to persons with legal disabilities, including infants. Id.
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II. The Evolution of Pennsylvania's Juvenile Laws
A. Common Law Presumptions of Incapacity
Under common law, there were no separate juvenile courts. 4
Nonetheless, courts recognized that children were less capable than
adults of understanding the wrongfulness of their actions. 5
Consequently, the common law allowed children to raise the defense of
infancy when faced with criminal charges. 6
The infancy defense created a presumption of incapacity for
children who, because of their age, could not appreciate the moral
dimensions of their behavior and for whom the threat of punishment
would not serve as a deterrent. ' 7  At common law, children under the
age of seven years were conclusively presumed to be incapable of
committing crimes."' Children between the ages of seven and fourteen
were also presumed to be incapable of committing crimes; however, this
presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the child understood the
wrongfulness of his acts.'9 When a child reached fourteen years of
14. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV.
503, 509 (1984).
15. Id. at 509-10. See also Allen v. United States, 150 U.S. 551, 558 (1893) (noting the
presumption that children under 15 years of age are generally incapable of committing crimes).
16. Walkover, supra note 14, at 509-10.
17. In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, 664 (Conn. 1989). The focus of the infancy defense is the
ability to understand the wrongfulness of one's acts, rather than the ability to formulate criminal
intent or a "guilty mind." In re G.T., 597 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). It is capacity, not
criminal intent, that is the focus of the common-law presumptions regarding children. Id. See also
State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557, 559 n.1 (Wash. 1984) (stating that a defendant's general
understanding of the juvenile justice system is insufficient to establish capacity). The exact age
at which children are capable of distinguishing between right and wrong and are able to conform
their behavior accordingly has not been pinpointed by the legal or psychiatric communities. See
Francis B. McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 181, 214-15 (1977). The flexibility inherent in the infancy
defense reflects the difficulty in determining exactly when children possess the capacity necessary
to commit a crime. Id. at 215. See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND *23-24 ('the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured by
years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judgment").
18. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.11, at 399 (2d ed.
1986). See also Commonwealth v. Green, 151 A.2d 241, 246 (Pa. 1959) (noting that Pennsylvania
has followed the common-law rules in measuring the capacity of a child to commit a crime);
Commonwealth v. Cavalier, 131 A. 229, 234 (Pa. 1925) (discussing the common-law rules
concerning a child's capacity to commit a crime).
19. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 18 § 4.11 at 399. See also, e.g., Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala.
323 (1858) (holding that an eleven-year-old slave was properly convicted of murder because
evidence showed that he understood the nature of his act and showed malice in its execution);
Heilman v. Commonwealth, I S.W. 731 (Ky. 1886) (holding that jury was properly instructed that
they could find defendant, a male child under twelve years of age, guilty of rape if he was
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age, the presumption of incapacity ended, and the child was regarded
as an adult capable of criminal behavior.2"
The problem with the common-law approach was that an
unsuccessful infancy defense meant that a child would be subject to the
same sanctions as an adult criminal. Conversely, a successful infancy
defense would preclude a child from receiving the treatment that he
likely needed. A child who committed murder, but was found not
guilty by reason of the infancy defense, still needed to be taught how
to refrain from engaging in such antisocial behavior because the
likelihood of continued criminal behavior was significant. 2' Because
the common law did not provide treatment for juvenile offenders, it did
not serve the best interests of child defendants.
B. The Birth of Parens Patriae and Early Legislative Efforts to
Reform Judicial Treatment of Juvenile Offenders
The common-law defense of infancy met its demise with legislative
recognition that children should be handled outside the jurisdiction of
criminal courts.22 In 1826, the Pennsylvania Legislature created the
House of Refuge, an institution in Philadelphia that was exclusively for
children.23 The purpose of this institution was to treat and rehabilitate
children and to protect them from the harsh environment which
characterized adult penal institutions.24  Thus, treatment was
substituted for punishment as the method for dealing with children who
committed crimes.25
In 1835, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the
constitutionality of committing an incorrigible child to the House of
Refuge without a jury trial. 26  The court held that no jury trial was
physically capable of the crime and knew the wrongfulness of his act).
20. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 18, § 4.11, at 399.
21. See Commonwealth v. Momingwake, 595 A.2d 158, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Cessna, 537 A.2d 834, 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
22. Walkover, supra note 14, at 506. For a description of the demise of the infancy defense
in the face of pre-delinquency theory, see generally Sanford J. Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile
Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 661-66 (1970).
23. Act of March 23, 1826, ch. 47, 1826 Pa. Laws 133 repealed by Act of Dec. 14, 1992,
No. 142, § 2, 1992 Pa. Laws 887, 888.
24. 1826 Pa. Laws at 133. For a discussion of the oppressive and dangerous conditions under
which children are held in adult jails, see Mark Soler, Litigation on Behalf of Children in Adult
Jails, 34 CRIME & DELiNQ. 190, 190-91, 195-97, 200-201 (1988). Children in such circumstances
were commonly confronted with isolation, darkness, filth, contact with adult inmates, and abuse
by both staff and other inmates. Id. at 190-91.
25. Walkover, supra note 14, at 512.
26. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). By 1835, the type of conduct for which children
could be committed to the House of Refuge had expanded from vagrancy and criminal offenses
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required because such a commitment was not intended as punishment,
but was merely for the benefit of the child.27 The court called the
state's power to confine children for their own benefit "parens
patriae. '  Accordingly, the state was not perceived as the punisher
of the child, but as the child's paternalistic guardian, acting in the
child's best interests.29 The moral blameworthiness of the child was
of no consequence because the child needed treatment and
rehabilitation.3 °
The doctrine of parens patriae became firmly rooted in
Pennsylvania law during the 1890s. The Act of June 8, 1893 allowed
courts to commit children not only to the House of Refuge, but also to
other charitable societies incorporated for the purpose of protecting
wayward or unmanageable children.3 The Act of June 12, 1893
mandated that children under sixteen years of age could not be
imprisoned with adults who were charged with or convicted of
crimes.32 Moreover, the trials of children were to be separate from the
trials of other cases.33  These acts represent the Legislature's
commitment to protecting children from the punitive treatment accorded
to adult criminals. The enactments prompted an immediate judicial
response. 34  The Act of June 12, 1893 was declared unconstitutional
to incorrigible or vicious conduct. Supplement of April 10, 1835, No. 92, § 1, 1835 Pa. Laws 133,
133. When an incorrigible child was considered beyond control by his parent or guardian, the
child could be committed to the House of Refuge. Id. Mary Ann Crouse was committed to the
Philadelphia House of Refuge by her mother for being difficult to manage; her father opposed the
incarceration and argued that since she had not been accorded a jury trial, the State's actions were
unconstitutional. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11.
For one of the few reports on the treatment of female juvenile offenders during the mid-
nineteenth century, see Chaim M. Rosenberg & Herbert J. Paine, Female Juvenile Delinquency:
A Nineteenth-Century Follow-Up, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 72 (1973). During the nineteenth century,
studies seldom analyzed the impact of detention on girls who passed through the courts and were
committed to reform institutions. Id. at 73. Nearly all of the studies on delinquents dealt with
boys. Id.
27. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11. The court declared that "not only [was] the restraint
of her person lawful, but it would [have been] an act of extreme cruelty to release her from it."
Id.
28. Id. For a definition of "parens patriae," see supra note 13. Ex parte Crouse was the
first delinquency case in this country in which the term "parens patriae" was used. Packel, supra
note 10, at3 n.ll.
29. In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1291 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (discussing the
prevailing philosophy in juvenile courts at the turn of the century).
30. Id.
3 1. Act of June 8, 1893, No. 301, 1893 Pa. Laws 399 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
27 (1965)).
32. Act of June 12, 1893, No. 328, § 1, 1893 Pa. Laws 459, 459 (repealed 1933).
33. Id. § 2.
34. Courts for Trial of Infants, 3 Pa. D. 753 (Bucks County Ct. 1893).
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because it was not uniform in its treatment of all children." In
classifying criminals by age, the Act provided different treatment to
children depending on whether they were under or over sixteen years
of age.36
Despite this constitutional setback, legislative efforts to help
wayward children continued. The establishment of a separate judicial
system to deal specifically with the problems of children marked the
next legislative step forward." In 1901, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly passed an act to regulate the treatment and control of
dependent, neglected, and delinquent children under the age of
sixteen.38 The Act granted the courts of oyer and terminer39 original
jurisdiction in all cases coming within the terms of the Act.4° A
special courtroom was to be provided for the hearing of such cases, and
the court was to be called the juvenile court.4'
Like the Act of 1893, the 1901 Act was subjected to close
constitutional scrutiny. In Mansfield's Case,42 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that the 1901 act violated Article III, Section 7 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which forbids the passage of a law granting
to individuals any special or exclusive privilege or immunity.43 The
superior court ruled that the Act's separation of individuals into two
35. Id. at 754. Judge Yerkes expressed his disapproval of the preferential treatment accorded
to children: "It is quite probable that this Act became a law through inadvertence. It represents
humanitarianism gone mad .... Some of the worst criminals known to the law are persons under
sixteen years of age." Id.
36. Id. The effect of the Act can be highlighted by considering the treatment of two children,
one just under sixteen years of age and one just over sixteen years of age, who together commit
a crime. The Act required that the offenses of each child be examined separately at a preliminary
hearing, be tried in separate courts, and be recorded on separate dockets. Act of June 12, 1893,
No. 328, 1893 Pa. Laws 459 (repealed 1933). The prompt and cost-effective administration of
justice was undoubtedly defeated by dual proceedings.
37. Packel, supra note 10, at 4.
38. Act of May 21, 1901, No. 185, 1901 Pa. Laws 279 repealed by Act of April 23, 1903,
No. 205, § 12, 1903 Pa. Laws 274, 278.
39. In the United States, certain higher criminal courts were called courts of oyer and
terminer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (6th ed. 1990).
40. § 2, 1901 Pa. Laws at 279. The Act generally did not apply to children under the age
of sixteen who were inmates of a state institution or training school for boys, an industrial school
for girls, or some other institution incorporated under Pennsylvania law. § 1, 1901 Pa. Laws at
279.
41. § 3, 1901 Pa. Laws at 280.
42. 22 Pa. Super. 224 (1903).
43. Id. at 234. See PA. CONST. art. Il, § 7. This case involved a petition to commit a minor
to the House of Refuge for breaking into a store and stealing money. Id. at 229. Despite the fact
that the lower court had been without jurisdiction to hear the case because the petition filed with
the court had not been verified by an affidavit, the superior court proceeded to review all aspects
of the Act of 1901 in the interest of public concern. Id.
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distinct age groups for purposes of criminal procedure conferred a
special immunity on children who were under sixteen years of age.44
C. Successful Legislative Efforts to Implement Parens Patriae
Advocates of a juvenile justice system wasted no time in
promulgating new legislation to aid troubled youths following the
setback in Mansfield's Case. In 1903, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly passed another act defining the powers of the courts over
dependent, neglected, incorrigible, and delinquent children under the age
of sixteen.45 Significantly, the juvenile courts no longer had original
jurisdiction over all children charged with violations of the law.46
Instead, only those children who would benefit from treatment at the
House of Refuge or other charitable societies were to be referred to the
juvenile court.47
Unlike the Act of 1901, the Act of 1903 withstood constitutional
scrutiny. In considering many of the same issues that were raised
before the superior court in Mansfield's Case,4" the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Fisher49 that the 1903 act
was constitutional and did not grant special privileges to children based
on age.5" The court emphasized that the Act of 1903 had not been
promulgated to punish juvenile offenders, but to save all children under
a certain age whose salvation was the duty of the State.5 The court
44. Mansfield's Case, 22 Pa. Super. at 233-34. The court also expressed its concern that the
1901 act could conflict with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at
234.
45. Act of April 23, 1903, No. 205, 1903 Pa. Laws 274 (repealed 1933). The importance
of the concept of parens patriae was highlighted in the Act's preamble, which stated that "the real
interests of... children require that they be not incarcerated in penitentiaries and jails, as members
of the criminal class, but be subjected to a wise care, treatment and control, that their evil
tendencies may be checked and their better instincts may be strengthened . . . ." Id. at 274.
46. § 1, 1903 Pa. Laws at 274.
47. Id. The 1903 act also contained no provision for a right to a jury trial, even if demanded
by an interested party. § 2, 1903 Pa. Laws at 275.
48. 22 Pa. Super. 224 (1903).
49. 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905).
50. Id.
51. Id. The court noted that the 1903 act did not create distinctly new courts, but merely
conferred additional powers upon the old courts and more clearly defined those powers. Id.
Although these courts were to be called juvenile courts when caring for children, the Fisher court
found that this was simply a convenient designation; no such courts, as independent tribunals, were
created. Id. The court also noted that a jury trial was not necessary in a juvenile proceeding.
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905). The Act of 1903 was not intended to govern
the trial of a child charged with a crime but was the means of saving a child from such an ordeal.
Id. In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the court emphasized that the Act violated no
protected right, but performed one of the most important duties that organized society owes to its
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reemphasized the active role that the State and its courts must play in
preserving and promoting the welfare of children through protection and
rehabilitation instead of punishment. 2 Thus, Fisher reaffirmed the
philosophy of parens patriae.
The court's decision in Fisher was a milestone in the development
of Pennsylvania's juvenile justice system. No longer was the
adjudication of children to be an all-or-nothing approach whereby
children would face either adult criminal sanctions or no sanctions at all
because of a successful infancy defense. The philosophy of parens
patriae provided Pennsylvania courts with a basis for evaluating the
unique needs of children. The courts' disposition of children accused
of committing crimes could thus be made in accordance with those
needs.
Despite early setbacks, legislation designed to establish guidelines
by which juveniles would be treated in Pennsylvania courts gained
momentum. The Act of 1903 was subsequently amended to add several
new provisions to protect the welfare of children. " These
amendments and related judicial decisions were consolidated in 1933
when the General Assembly passed comprehensive legislation dealing
with the care, trial, placement, and commitment of delinquent,
dependent, and neglected children under sixteen years of age. 4 The
1933 act clearly distinguished juvenile court powers from those powers
exercised in the ordinary administration of the criminal law.55
Although the philosophy of parens patriae was perpetuated in the
Act of 1933, the Act provided that juvenile courts could not exercise
original jurisdiction over children who had committed murder.56 The
helpless members: to protect them. Id. at 201.
52. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905).
53. One amendment provided that juvenile court orders were subject to change or extension
until minors under sixteen years of age reached twenty-one. Act of April 22, 1909, No. 73, 1909
Pa. Laws 119 (repealed 1933). A second amendment gave juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction
over all proceedings which may have been brought before them. Act of June 28, 1923, No. 345,
1923 Pa. Laws 898 (repealed 1933). Where, however, the interests of the State required
prosecution of a particular case, a judge could certify the case to the district attorney, who would
proceed with it as if the juvenile court had never obtained jurisdiction. Id. § 11. The amendment
specified that the powers of the juvenile court could be exercised whenever any magistrate or
justice of the peace committed a child arrested for any indictable offense other than murder. §
2(2), 1923 Pa. Laws at 899.
54. See Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, 1933 Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972).
55. Id. For a discussion of the decision-making process of juvenile court judges and the
factors associated with judicial decisions, see generally Frank R. Scarpitti & Richard M.
Stephenson, Juvenile Court Dispositions: Factors in the Decision-Making Process, 17 CRIME &
DELINQ. 142 (1971).
56. § 4(2), 1933 Pa. Laws at 1435.
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Legislature's decision to withhold from juvenile courts original
jurisdiction over murder cases was evidence of the Legislature's intent
to treat murder differently from any other crime that could be
committed by children. Where a prima facie case of felonious homicide
was alleged, the juvenile had to be held for further proceedings in
criminal court.57 Jurisdiction would be transferred to a juvenile court
only if the trial judge decided that it was in the best interests of both the
child and society not to pursue criminal prosecution.58 Thus, even
when the charge against a juvenile was murder, the best interests of the
child were still evaluated in keeping with the parens patriae philosophy.
The establishment of a juvenile justice system in Pennsylvania
implied that the common-law approach for dealing with the special
needs of children was no longer the best way to protect their welfare.
Clearly, the rehabilitative foundation of parens patriae was beneficial
to children accused of committing crimes, including murder. Under
parens patriae, children who committed murder were less likely to face
the punitive sanctions of an adult criminal court. Unless a child posed
a danger to society, jurisdiction over the case would be transferred from
criminal to juvenile court. This had not been the case under common
law, when there were no separate juvenile courts.
Although the parens patriae concept has been credited with the
development of a judicial system that focused on individual diagnosis
and treatment,59 that focus virtually ignored traditional criminal
safeguards, such as the right to a jury trial.60 In re Holmes6 brought
concern for the lack of such traditional safeguards to the attention of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.62 In upholding the provisions of the Act
of 1933, the supreme court emphasized that juvenile courts were not
criminal courts.63 Therefore, the constitutional rights guaranteed to
adult criminals were not applicable to children brought before juvenile
courts. 64
57. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 299 A.2d 254, 264 (Pa. 1973); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 270 A.2d 200, 202 (Pa. 1970); In re Gaskins, 244 A.2d 662, 669 (Pa. 1968).
58. In re Gaskins, 244 A.2d at 669.
59. Packel, supra note 10, at 8.
60. Id.
61. 109 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1954).
62. In Holmes, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania had adjudicated a thirteen-year-old boy
delinquent on larceny charges despite his parents' alleged failure to receive adequate notice of his
hearing and the admission of hearsay evidence in the proceeding. In re Holmes, 103 A.2d 454
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1954).
63. In re Holmes, 109 A.2d at 525.
64. Id. In his dissent, Justice Musmanno previewed the future controversy that would arise
over according juvenile delinquents constitutional rights:
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The controversy over the appropriate constitutional criminal
procedure in juvenile adjudications would be a major issue facing the
U.S. Supreme Court during the 1960s. Throughout the country,
pressure was building for a constitutional overhaul of particular
procedures within the juvenile courts.6' At the same time, however,
children were being denied fundamental rights, including the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to adequate notice, and the right to
confront witnesses. While juvenile courts were not considered criminal
courts, they still had broad discretion to decide the fates of children who
were accused of crimes." The type and duration of a child's
treatment program depended on the evidence presented to the juvenile
court.67  Therefore, children needed the ability to assert fundamental
constitutional rights in order to mitigate possible abuses of discretion by
juvenile courts. Pressures for constitutional reform of the juvenile
justice system, both in Pennsylvania and in other states, culminated in
a series of responses from the United States Supreme Court.
III. Constitutional Safeguards in the Juvenile Court: A Movement
Away from Parens Patriae Toward the Criminalization of Juvenile
Proceedings
Four cases decided by the United States Supreme Court during the
late 1960s and early 1970s had a significant effect on the philosophical
underpinnings of the juvenile justice system in Pennsylvania.6 ' The
decisions ultimately sparked new legislation in Pennsylvania that was
once again designed to reform the treatment of children who were
accused of crimes.69
The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees to all citizens
of the United States due process of law.... I cannot bring myself to accept[] the self-
revolting [sic] idea that the Legislature intended that children should be deprived of
their liberty on evidence that would walk their grown-up elders triumphantly out of
Criminal Court.
Id. at 535.
65. Packel, supra note 10, at 9.
66. See In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1954); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa.
1905); In re Mont, 103 A.2d 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954).
67. See cases cited supra note 66.
68. McKeiver v. 'Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See generally
Walkover, supra note 14, at 517-23 (analyzing the purported demise of the parens patriae
philosophy in juvenile courts and the recharacterization ofjuvenile courts as criminal in nature).
69. See infra part IV.
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With Kent v. United States, 70 the Supreme Court began to apply
traditional criminal justice principles to juvenile proceedings. 7' The
Court recognized that such proceedings were considered to be civil
rather than criminal in nature' and, accordingly, children could not
complain when they were deprived of the numerous rights that were
guaranteed to criminal defendants.7' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
held that the philosophy of parens patriae was not an invitation to
procedural arbitrarinessY.7  Thus, the failure to comply with statutorily
mandated procedural safeguards was improper." The Court declined,
however, to rule that the constitutional rights guaranteed to adult
criminals must be applied in juvenile proceedings.76
The relationship between the procedural informality of juvenile
courts and the constitutional right to due process of law was further
developed by the Supreme Court in In re Gault. 7 In his appeal, Gault
claimed that the Arizona juvenile court had violated his constitutional
rights to notice of the charges against him, to counsel, to confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses against him, and to the exercise of
a privilege against self-incrimination .7  The Supreme Court agreed
with Gault, finding that despite the highest benevolent motives,
70. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
71. Id. Morris Kent was arrested at the age of sixteen on charges of housebreaking, robbery
and rape. Id. at 543, 548. As a juvenile, he was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court unless that court waived its jurisdiction after a "full
investigation" of the facts. Id. at 54748. Instead of ruling on Kent's motion for a hearing on the
issue of waiver, the juvenile court entered an order waiving its jurisdiction, and Kent was sent to
the district court for trial as an adult Id. at 546. The court made no findings and provided no
reasons for its waiver of jurisdiction. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 546 (1966). For a
general discussion of waiver proceedings, see SAMuEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4-1 to 4-32 (1980).
72. Kent, 383 U.S. at 555. In ajuvenile adjudication, the state was supposed to act asparens
patriae and not as an adversary.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552-53 (1966).
76. Id. at 556. The court noted that in juvenile proceedings in other jurisdictions, a child was
not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a speedy and public trial, to trial by jury, to
immunity against self-incrimination and to confrontation of his accusers. Id. See also Pee v.
United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959). But cf. Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (holding that a juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction was invalid where a juvenile was
not advised of his right to either retained or appointed counsel).
77. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was committed to the Arizona
Industrial School until he reached the age of majority for having made obscene telephone calls.
Id. at 4, 7-8. If Gault had been over eighteen and not subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, his maximum punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment for not
more than two months. Id. at 29.
78. Id. at 9-10.
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departures from established principles of due process had frequently
resulted in depriving some juveniles of fundamental rights.79 The
Court acknowledged that due process of law is the primary and
indispensable foundation of individual freedom."0 The Court held that
some constitutional safeguards guaranteed to adult criminals by the
Fourteenth Amendment should similarly be accorded to juveniles."'
The Supreme Court, however, did not undermine the basic philosophy
of the juvenile courts which was to treat and rehabilitate children, rather
than punish them. 2 It was not the intention of the Supreme Court to
convert juvenile courts into criminal courts for young people.3
The constitutional safeguards articulated in In re Gault were
carried one step further in 1970 when the Supreme Court considered the
appropriate standard of proof in juvenile adjudications. 4  The Court
stated in In re Winship 5 that the essentials of due process and fair
treatment mandated proof beyond a reasonable doubt when a juvenile
is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an
adult.8 6 The Court concluded that requiring proof beyond a reasonable
79. Id. at 18-19. For a discussion of a juvenile's rights to due process of law, see Gallegos
v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (holding that a coerced confession on which a conviction of first
degree murder may have rested was obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (holding that the Due Process Clause barred the use of a juvenile's
coerced confession); Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that ajuvenile
court's waiver of jurisdiction was invalid where the juvenile had not been advised of his right to
counsel).
80. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
81. Id. In Gault, the Supreme Court held that juvenile offenders were constitutionally entitled
to timely and adequate written notice, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the assistance
of counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Id. The Court noted that its decision addressed
only the adjudicatory stage of juvenile proceedings, not the procedures or constitutional rights
applicable to the pre-judicial or post-adjudicative stages of the juvenile process. Id. at 13. For
a multistate analysis of how the presence of an attorney affects the disposition of cases in juvenile
courts, see Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393 (1988).
82. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court reiterated the opinion expressed in
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), that while ajuvenile court adjudication of delinquency
need not conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, it must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment. Id. at 30.
83. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 234 A.2d 9, 17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (interpreting In re
Gault).
84. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Court noted that it was only analyzing a single,
narrow question and was not considering whether there were other "essentials of due process and
fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 359 n. 1.
85. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
86. Id. at 361-68. The extent to which the juvenile justice system had begun to take on the
characteristics of the adult criminal system was reflected in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion:
"When one assesses the consequences of an erroneous factual determination in a juvenile
delinquency proceeding in which a youth is accused of a crime, I think it must be concluded that,
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doubt would not force states "to abandon or displace any of the
substantive benefits of the juvenile process.""7
The holdings in Kent, Gault and Winship indicated a shift from
judicial informality in the juvenile justice system to reliance on
safeguards of constitutional criminal procedure. However, any
recharacterization of the juvenile court as criminal in nature was halted
by the Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.8 , In
McKeiver, the Supreme Court held that juveniles are not constitutionally
entitled to trials by jury in delinquency proceedings. 89 The Court
reaffirmed that a juvenile court proceeding had not yet been equated
with a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment.9" Although the Court upheld its earlier conclusion that a
juvenile adjudication must measure up to the essentials of due process
and fair treatment,9' it concluded that a jury was no more fair or
accurate a factfinder than a judge alone.92  Finally, the Court
recognized that juvenile courts needed to retain their flexibility to deal
with the varying needs of delinquent children and that jury trials would
not encourage such flexibility.93
In these four decisions, the Supreme Court did not specifically
address the adjudication of children who committed murder. Yet, the
Court set forth the constitutional safeguards which were to be accorded
to such children if they were tried for murder in juvenile proceedings.
Although a child who committed murder would be guaranteed such
while the consequences are not identical to those in a criminal case, the differences will not
support a distinction in the standard of proof." Id. at 373-74 (Harlan, I., concurring).
87. Id. at 367 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967)).
88. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
89. Id. The Court noted that the constitutional fights provided to juveniles during
delinquency proceedings include the privilege against self-incrimination, the standard of proof of
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the rights to appropriate notice, to confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, and to counsel. Id. at 533.
90. Id. at 541. See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 17, 49-50 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970). If a juvenile court
proceeding had fallen within the reach of the Sixth Amendment, "the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury," would have been mandated. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
91. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. The Court noted that some of the constitutional
requirements attendant upon a criminal trial had equal application to a juvenile adjudication. Id.
at 533. Yet, the Court refrained from saying that all rights which were constitutionally assured
to adult criminals were to be made available to juveniles at delinquency proceedings. Id.
92. Id. at 543.
93. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-53 (1971). In his concurring opinion
in McKeiver, Justice White asserted that juries need not be mandated as long as a juvenile justice
system is reasonably. based on a parens patriae philosophy, even if its implementation is not
perfect. Id.
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constitutional rights if tried as an adult, the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of such rights in juvenile courts.
The importance placed on constitutional criminal procedures in
juvenile courts signaled a shift away from the parens patriae
philosophy. Juvenile courts appeared to become less treatment-oriented
and more criminally-oriented.94 It would be a mistake, however, to
characterize the juvenile courts as having become synonymous with
adult criminal courts. The Supreme Court stopped well short of
effecting such a transformation. Rather, the Court merely instituted
procedural safeguards to prevent abuses of discretion within the juvenile
justice system. Without such safeguards, children accused of crimes
would be subject to the unfettered power of juvenile court judges. The
fact that juvenile courts had not become criminal courts for children
supports the idea that the philosophy of parens patriae continued to
play a role, albeit diminished, in the country's juvenile justice systems.
In Pennsylvania, the continued importance of parens patriae was
emphasized by the promulgation of new juvenile justice legislation,
which is the focus of the next section.
IV. Pennsylvania's Response to Constitutional Safeguards: The
Juvenile Act of 1972 and Reinforcement of the Parens Patriae
Philosophy
In an effort to comply with the constitutional standards enunciated
by the Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed the Juvenile
Act of 1972. 95 The Act has four express purposes: to preserve the
family unit and protect children; to substitute care and rehabilitation for
criminal sanctions when dealing with delinquent children; to separate
children from their parents only when necessary for their welfare or for
public safety; and to protect the legal rights of all parties in a juvenile
proceeding. 96 Although the Supreme Court's rulings had eliminated
the procedural informality inherent in the parens patriae philosophy,
94. See In re Javier A,, 159 Cal. App. 3d 913 (1984); In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950
(Nev. 1983); In re K.V.N., 283 A.2d 337 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971); State v. Lawley, 591
P.2d 772 (Wash. 1979); State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401 (W. Va. 1980). See also
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988).
95. Act of December 6, 1972, No. 333, 1972 Pa. Laws 1464, amended by Judiciary Act of
1976, No. 142, 1976 Pa. Laws 586, repealed by Judiciary Act Repealer Act, No. 53, § 2, 1978 Pa.
Laws 202, 346 (codified as amended at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301-6365 (1990 & Supp. 1993)).
See generally Robert W. Barton, Comment, Proposed Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, 75 DICK. L. REV.
235 (1970) (discussing legislative changes to Pennsylvania's juvenile justice system).
96. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b) (1990).
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Pennsylvania's new legislation reflected the philosophy's benevolent
intent.
A. Jurisdiction of Criminal and Juvenile Courts
The Juvenile Act vests the courts of common pleas with
jurisdiction over all children coming within the provisions of the Act.9 7
Those courts have jurisdiction over both delinquent and dependent
children.98 A delinquent child is a child ten years of age or older
whom the court has found to have committed a delinquent act and is in
need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.99 A dependent child
is a child under the age of ten who has committed a delinquent act."
A delinquent act is any act that would be a crime in Pennsylvania, a
crime in another state if the act occurred in that state, a crime under
Federal law, or a crime under local ordinances.1
°1
97. See id. §§ 6301 (defining "court"), 6303 (defining scope of Juvenile Act). To distinguish
between the different functions performed by the courts of common pleas, this Comment will refer
to the these courts as either juvenile or criminal courts, depending on the functions being
performed. The Juvenile Act defines a "child" to include the following individuals: (1) those
under age 18; (2) those under 21 who have committed an act of delinquency before reaching age
18; and (3) those adjudicated dependent before reaching age 18 and who have requested the court
to retain jurisdiction until a course of instruction or treatment has been completed. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6302 (1990).
98. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6303(a)(1) (1990).
99. Id. § 6302.
100. Id. Several factors are considered in determining whether a child is a dependent child.
According to the Juvenile Act, a "dependent child" is one who:
(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law,
or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or
morals; (2) has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law; (3) has been
abandoned by his parents, guardian, or other custodian; (4) is without a parent,
guardian, or legal custodian; (5) while subject to compulsory school attendance is
habitually and without justification truant from school; (6) has committed a specific act
or acts of habitual disobedience of the reasonable and lawful commands of his parent,
guardian or other custodian and who is ungovernable and found to be in need of care,
treatment or supervision; (7) is under the age of ten years and has committed a
delinquent act; (8) has been formerly adjudicated dependent, and is under the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its conditions or placements and who commits an
act which is defined as ungovernable in paragraph (6); or (9) has been referred pursuant
to section 6323 (relating to informal adjustment), and who commits an act which is
defined as ungovernable in paragraph (6).
101. Id. The inclusion of crimes committed in other states or under federal law ensures that
children residing in Pennsylvania may receive the benefits of the Juvenile Act rather than be
subjected to a trial in another state or in a federal court. Packel, supra note 10, at 12-13. Such
language indicates that while the parens patriae philosophy is fundamental to Pennsylvania's
Juvenile Act, it does not play the same role in the juvenile justice systems of other states.
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Significantly, a "delinquent act" does not include the crime of
murder," 2 which continues to be within the original jurisdiction of the
criminal courts." 3 The omission of murder from the definition of a
delinquent act reflects continued legislative concern for the serious
nature and consequences of such a crime." It also indicates an
unwillingness to automatically grant jurisdiction to the juvenile courts
over all children accused of murder. The Pennsylvania Legislature
implicitly recognized that not every child who commits murder will be
amenable to the rehabilitative approach of the parens patriae
philosophy. Yet, for every child who could benefit from treatment,
adjudication by the juvenile courts will be appropriate, as reflected by
the Act's transfer provision. 5
B. Transfer of Jmenile Murder Cases from Criminal to Juvenile
Courts
According to Section 6322(a) of the Juvenile Act, when a child
commits murder, jurisdiction is vested in the criminal court and the
child must petition to have his case transferred to a juvenile court.
°6
Treatment as a juvenile is not an absolute right in a murder proceeding,
but is instead in the discretion of the criminal court. 0 7  In
102. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302(2).
103. Id. § 6322(a). The prosecution of all criminal acts involving juvenile offenders, except
murder, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Id. § 6322(a).
104. The seriousness with which some jurisdictions regard murder committed by children is
reflected in several state statutes that permit the execution ofjuvenile capital offenders. See Maria
M. Homan, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role in the Development of a Mitigation
Defense, 53 BROOK. L. R£v. 767 (1987). The Supreme Court has held that imposing the death
penalty upon juveniles does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). But see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that imposition of the death penalty on a fifteen-year-old convicted of
first degree murder violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment). The role of counsel should be to provide sufficient information about the juvenile's
family, educational background, and psychological makeup to constitute a convincing defense in
mitigation of the death penalty. Homan, supra.
105. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6322(a).
106. Section 6322(a) of the Juvenile Act provides that:
[If it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding that the defendant is a child, this
chapter shall immediately become applicable, and the court shall forthwith halt further
criminal proceedings, and, where appropriate, transfer the case to the division or ajudge
of the court assigned to conduct juvenile hearings .... If it appears to the court in a
criminal proceeding charging murder, that the defendant is a child, the case may
similarly be transferred and the provisions of this chapter applied.
Id.
107. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1975) (holding that ajuvenile
defendant in a murder case has the burden of showing that his case should not be in criminal
court). Under the former Juvenile Court Law, courts had no discretion to transfer murder cases.
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Commonwealth v. Pyle,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
a juvenile defendant in a murder case bears the burden of showing that
his case does not belong in criminal court.'0 9 The court interpreted
the Juvenile Act to permit the transfer of murder proceedings to a
juvenile court "where the young offender's need for care, guidance and
control as a juvenile outweighs the state and society's need to apply
legal restraint and discipline as an adult."".. The court reasoned that
this interpretation was inherent in the Pennsylvania Legislature's
decision to "widen[] the avenue for juvenile treatment" by permitting
transfer of murder proceedings to juvenile court."'
The Juvenile Act did not, however, address the issue of what
specific factors courts should evaluate in determining whether a transfer
of jurisdiction is appropriate in a particular murder case. 12
Nevertheless, in Commonwealth v. Pyle, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania made transfer to juvenile court contingent on proof of a
defendant's need for and amenability to the supervision, care, or
rehabilitation that he could receive under the juvenile system." 3 In
evaluating Pyle, the court suggested consideration of such factors as the
child's personal make-up, the child's previous history, and the nature
and circumstances of the alleged murder." 4  The court held that
where a child cannot prove that he belongs in a juvenile setting,
jurisdiction remains vested in the criminal court." 5
Act of June 2, 1933, No. 311, 1933 Pa. Laws 1433 (repealed 1972). Once a prima facie case of
murder was established, the trial court judge was required to hold the juvenile for further
proceedings in the criminal courts. See, e.g., In re Gaskins, 244 A.2d 662 (Pa. 1968).
108. 342 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1975). This was the first case to reach the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania that involved the discretionary transfer of a murder case to juvenile court. Id. at 104.
109. Id. at 106. The decision to transfer a child from adult to juvenile court does not affect
the procedural or substantive aspects of a conviction in a criminal court. Id. at n.12. Because the
Commonwealth still bears the burden of proving murder beyond a reasonable doubt, placing the
burden on children to show that they do not belong in criminal court in no way denies them their
rights to due process. Id.
I 10. Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d 101, 104 (Pa. 1975) (emphasis omitted). Research has
suggested that the ultimate fate of a youth who commits a crime may be determined by factors
other than the act itself. See William H. Barton, Discretionary Decision-Making in Juvenile
Justice, 22 CRIME & DELINQ. 470 (1976). In addition to the offense and perpetrator's offense
history, the defendant's sex, race and social class appear to be salient to decision-makers. Id.
111. Pyle, 342 A.2d at 104.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 106.
114. Id. at 106-07 n.13. The Pyle court developed its criteria by referring to Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 565-68 (1966). Id.
115. Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d at 107. Pennsylvania courts have had many occasions
to determine that, for a variety of reasons, particular children would not be amenable to the
Commonwealth's juvenile justice system. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Romeri, 470 A.2d 498 (Pa.
1983); Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 422 A.2d 116 (Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Wade, 402 A.2d
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Because the criminal court has original jurisdiction over all murder
charges, irrespective of the age of the alleged perpetrator, there is room
for abuse of discretion by the criminal courts." 6  This may be
especially true where children accused of murder are young, but society
nonetheless demands that they be punished. In recognition of the
potential for such abuse, the Juvenile Act sets forth guidelines for
assuring that those children who are amenable to treatment will receive
rehabilitation and not punishment." 7
In 1986, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the Juvenile Act to
specify the criteria that should be weighed by a criminal court in
deciding whether to transfer a child accused of murder to juvenile
court." 8 Section 6322(a) provides that a child shall be required to
show the court that he is amenable to treatment, supervision, or
rehabilitation as a juvenile by meeting certain criteria." 9 The factors
to be considered by a criminal court in determining whether to exercise
original jurisdiction over a child accused of murder include the child's
age, mental capacity, and maturity; the degree of criminal sophistication
displayed by the child; prior records; the nature and extent of prior
delinquent history, including the success or failure of any previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child; whether the child
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction;
probation or institutional reports; the nature and circumstances of the
acts for which the transfer is sought; and any other relevant factors. 
20
The factors set forth above give a court of common pleas sound
discretion to look back to the time of the murder, to look presently at
the time of the petition for a transfer to juvenile court, and to look
forward to the period of rehabilitation when evaluating whether a child
1360 (Pa. 1979); Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 568 A.2d 1313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Cessna, 537 A.2d 834 (Pa. Super. Ct 1988). But see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Greiner, 388 A.2d 698 (Pa. 1978) (holding that evidence was insufficient to establish that
defendant's case should not be transferred to juvenile court).
116. A criminal court's determination about a transfer to juvenile court will not be disturbed
absent a showing that the judge committed a "gross abuse of discretion." Commonwealth v.
Leatherbury, 568 A.2d 1313, 1315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In defining "gross abuse of discretion,"
the superior court has stated that such abuse must consist of "a misapplication of the law or an
exercise of manifestly unreasonable judgment based on partiality, prejudice or ill will."
Commonwealth v. Brown, 480 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). It would appear that
anything short of a gross abuse of discretion could not be successfully challenged.
117. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) (1990). The guidelines set forth in the
Juvenile Act codified the criteria for amenability to treatment enunciated by the court in
Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d at 101, 106-07 n.13.
118. Act of Dec. 11, 1986, no. 165, Sec. 7, § 6322, 1986 Pa. Laws 1521, 1526.
119. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6322(a).
120. Id. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A).
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is amenable to care as a juvenile. 2 ' Such a determination is to be
made only after careful scrutiny of the child's personal make-up, the
child's previous history, and the nature and circumstances of the alleged
homicide.' While a child accused of murder continues to be subject
to the original jurisdiction of the criminal courts in Pennsylvania, the
provision for transfer to the juvenile courts reflects the viability of the
rehabilitative philosophy of parens patriae and its important role in
Pennsylvania's juvenile courts. It also reflects the fact that some
children who commit murder will not be amenable to the juvenile
justice system and should properly be tried in adult criminal courts.
C. Age as a Factor for Juvenile Adjudication
Although the Juvenile Act does not specify a minimum age
requirement for criminal court jurisdiction over children accused of
murder,'23 the Legislature intended children to be treated differently
depending upon their age. 24  The Juvenile Act contains a statutory
scheme in which the treatment of children charged with criminal
offenses changes with age.'25 The Act provides that in order to be
considered a "dangerous juvenile offender," a child must be fifteen
years of age or older and have committed specified violent crimes.
26
The use of fifteen years of age as a flexible dividing line to
separate "older" from "younger" juvenile offenders has considerable
merit."" The older a child is, the more likely that child will pose a
threat to society and will need legal restraint. 21 Moreover, older
children are more likely to be aware of the inappropriate nature of their
121. Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308, 1315 (Pa. 1992).
122. Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d 101, 106 n.13 (Pa. 1975). See also, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Morningwake, 595 A.2d 158 (Pa. Super. C. 1991) (concluding that there was
no evidence that a juvenile accused of murder would be amenable to treatment where he had
committed prior crimes, had shunned all efforts to rehabilitate his behavior, had been aware of the
inappropriateness of his conduct, and had rejected all help that was offered to enable him to
change his destructive lifestyle).
123. Pennsylvania is one of only four states that does not specify a minimum age requirement
for criminal court jurisdiction over children accused of murder. Amy M. Winebrake, Recent
Decision, 66 TEMPLE L. REv. 563, 573 (1993). In the majority of states, the minimum age
requirement is fifteen years. Id. The lowest minimum age requirement is fourteen years. Id.
124. See generally 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301-6365.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 6302.
127. For a discussion of common law presumptions regarding juvenile offenders, see supra
notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
128. See Commonwealth v. Zoller, 498 A.2d 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 480 A.2d 1171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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behavior.'29 Older children are also less likely to be effectively
rehabilitated during the time within which the juvenile court has
jurisdiction. 3 ° Indeed, the older juvenile offenders are, the more likely
it is that previous attempts to rehabilitate them have failed.' 3 '
The flexibility inherent in Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act avoids the
dangers of a rigidly enforced age-specific dividing line for juvenile
adjudication. There will certainly be instances when children fifteen
years of age and older who have committed murder will be amenable
to treatment in the juvenile system, and the Juvenile Act can be relied
upon to protect the welfare of such children. The transfer provision of
the Juvenile Act allows courts to consider the needs of society and the
needs of children in an effort to find the best way of protecting the
interests of both.
32
Subjecting some older children to the punitive sanctions of adult
criminal courts may appear harsh. Yet, the basic philosophy and
purpose of the juvenile courts will have no value to children who are
not amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system. By placing the
burden on children to prove their amenability to juvenile court
adjudications, the Juvenile Act has not undermined the philosophy of
parens patriae. Rather, it has given credibility to the implementation
of such a philosophy by protecting it from abuse by older children who
are not amenable to its benefits and should be properly subjected to
adult criminal courts.
V. How Pennsylvania Should Treat Children Who Commit Murder
The provisions of the Juvenile Act indicate that the philosophy of
parens patriae is firmly in place as the foundation of Pennsylvania's
juvenile justice system. The fact that it took several years to resolve
Cameron Kocher's status as either a juvenile or an adult indicates that
Pennsylvania courts continue to be troubled when deciding how to treat
children who have committed murder. Nonetheless, Pennsylvania
courts must strive to remain committed to the parens patriae
129. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Momingwake, 595 A.2d 158, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
130. See, e.g., Morningwake, 595 A.2d at 162; Commonwealth v. Zoller, 498 A.2d 436 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985).
131. Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 568 A.2d 1313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). For a discussion
of the juvenile justice system's failure to rehabilitate young offenders, see Anna L. Simpson,
Comment, Rehabilitation as the Justification of a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CAL. L.
REV. 984 (1976).
132. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6322(a), 6355 (1990); Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d 101
(Pa. 1975).
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philosophy, despite trends in other jurisdictions towards criminalizing
juvenile courts.
A. The Criminalization of Juvenile Courts in Other Jurisdictions
Following the Supreme Court's pronouncements that many
traditional procedural safeguards should be available in juvenile
adjudications,' the juvenile statutes in several jurisdictions began to
emphasize accountability and punishment, rather than treatment and
rehabilitation.'34 These jurisdictions interpreted the Supreme Court's
decisions as standing for the proposition that juvenile proceedings
impose "almost criminal" liability.'35 Because the infancy defense is
a criminal defense, courts have begun to hold that it should be available
in delinquency proceedings.'36 The renewed acceptance of the
infancy defense in juvenile adjudications"' protects the welfare of
children in "almost criminal" proceedings.' 38
Concern about crime and frustration over the apparent ineffective
treatment of juvenile offenders has led to a tougher stance toward
133. See supra part III.
134. Walkover, supra note 14, at 523.
135. In amending juvenile laws, legislatures have acknowledged the importance of public
safety, punishment, and individual accountability in the juvenile justice system. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.011(2)(c) (West 1992) (stating that the purpose of the laws relating to children
alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency
by prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior);
see also In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. CL App. 1988) (recognizing the criminal aspect of
juvenile proceedings); In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947 (Nev. 1983) (endorsing punishment as
a legitimate purpose of juvenile courts).
136. State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557, 560 (Wash. 1984); In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1293
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). But see Jennings v. State, 384 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1980) (holding
inapplicable the presumption that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen is incapable of
forming criminal intent); State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1976) (holding that the common-law
presumptions of incapacity are inapplicable in a delinquency proceeding).
137. See, e.g., In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127 (Cal. 1970); In re William A., 548 A.2d 130,
131-34 (Md. 1988); In re Andrew M., 398 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825-27 (1977). For a discussion of the
role that criminal responsibility should play in juvenile courts, see McCarthy, supra note 17
(arguing that the criminal law concepts of culpability and responsibility should be reintegrated into
juvenile court proceedings because of the similarity between the philosophical bases of criminal
sanctions and the new punitive juvenile courts).
138. The function of the infancy defense is to screen the culpable from the non-culpable. See
supra notes 15, 17-20 and accompanying text. The defense, therefore, has meaning only in
relation to the broader question of whether the juvenile court is, in general, in the business of
ascertaining blameworthiness rather than diagnosing and treating troubled youths. For cases
holding that the infancy defense is inconsistent with the parens patriae philosophy of juvenile
proceedings, see Gammons v. Beflat, 696 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1985); In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661
(Conn. 1989); State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1976); In re Robert M., 441 N.Y.S.2d 860
(1981); In re G.T., 597 A.2d 638 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180 (R.I. 1981);
Ex rel Humphrey, 201 S.W. 771 (Tenn. 1918).
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children who commit crimes. 39  Courts have not specifically
addressed the issue of whether a child who is before a juvenile court on
murder charges can assert the infancy defense. Jurisdictions which
have embraced the infancy defense in juvenile court proceedings have
done so with respect to less serious crimes. Nonetheless, the trend
towards criminalizing juvenile courts would indicate that such a
criminal defense would be allowed.
Acceptance of the infancy defense in juvenile murder proceedings
treats more leniently older children for whom punishment may be
warranted. Older children are frequently found to be less amenable to
rehabilitative treatment 4' and are thus ineligible for transfer to
juvenile court. 42  A successful infancy defense allows these children
to escape the penal sanctions imposed by criminal courts,' despite
the fact that their behavior may warrant such penal sanctions. An
unsuccessful infancy defense means that these same children will be in
no worse a position than if their petitions for transfer to juvenile court
were denied.
In contrast, younger children who successfully raise the infancy
defense will not have the benefit of rehabilitative guidance. Younger
children who commit murder are more likely to be found amenable to
treatment and thus will be transferred to juvenile courts. A successful
infancy defense raised in juvenile court means that children who have
committed murder will not be subject to penal sanctions. While this
may appear to be an excellent result, it may in fact create another bad
situation. Children who most need the care afforded by juvenile
adjudication and who need to be taught the capacity to refrain from
anti-social behavior will be deprived of the care they need. 144  The
139. Ralph A. Weisheit & Diane M. Alexander, Juvenile Justice Philosophy and the Demise
of Parens Patriae, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1988, at 56, 57. The "safety valve theory" suggests that
society constantly seeks to punish juveniles more strictly so that they do not "get off easy."
Jeffrey S. Schwartz, The Youth Offender: Transfer to the Adult Court and Subsequent Sentencing,
6 CRiM. JUST. J. 281, 294-95 (1983). Society generally does not wish to afford juveniles a right
to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system unless it can retain some control over sanctions. Id.
at 295.
140. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (armed robbery); In re William A., 548 A.2d
130 (Md. 1988) (storehouse breaking, felony theft and malicious destruction of property); In re
Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (possession of heroin with intent to
distribute); State v. Q.D., 685 P.2d 557 (Wash. 1984) (trespass).
141. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6322(a).
143. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
144. Failure to deliver the treatment and care promised by juvenile statutes results in simple
custodial confinement and is the essence of a due process violation. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d
352, 358-60 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that juveniles have a Fourteenth Amendment due process
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result could be lives of continued criminal behavior. More importantly,
where an infancy defense is not successful, younger children will be
subject to the sanctions of a juvenile justice system that has become
more penal in nature.'45 Imposing penal sanctions on young children
is arguably not in their best interests.'4 6  The trend toward
criminalizing juvenile courts may satisfy public demands for a tougher
stance on crime, 4" but it increases the negative social and
psychological impact that punitive sanctions are likely to have on young
children.
B. Suggestions for the Pennsylvania Approach
The trend toward criminalizing juvenile courts is inconsistent with
the philosophy of Pennsylvania's juvenile laws. Pennsylvania's
adherence to parens patriae as the means for dealing with children who
commit murder is clearly designed to address the best interests of
children in the Commonwealth. However, judicial divisiveness over the
fate of Cameron Kocher reinforces the idea that, despite the heinous
nature of the crime of murder, a child's amenability to treatment must
be broadly analyzed. Clearly, children who are incapable of
understanding the wrongfulness of their actions should not be subject
to penal sanctions. Such children should always be able to successfully
meet the criteria in the Juvenile Act for a transfer to juvenile court. 4 '
The fact that Cameron Kocher's case was not immediately
transferred to a juvenile court suggests that Pennsylvania courts need to
reanalyze the basic philosophy of the Commonwealth's Juvenile Act.
First and most importantly, the language of the Act suggests that the
Pennsylvania Legislature did not intend to subject a young juvenile, like
right to rehabilitative treatment), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See also Martarella v. Kelly,
349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that state-imposed detention under parens patriae
must include adequate treatment to meet the constitutional requirements of due process and the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). But see Commonwealth v. Lucas, 622 A.2d
325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that a juvenile's incarceration in an adult prison did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
145. See In re Javier, 159 Cal. App. 3d 913 (1984) (noting that the purposes of the juvenile
process have become more punitive, the procedures more formalistic, adversarial and public, and
the consequences of conviction much more harsh).
146. Evaluations of juvenile correction facilities in the years since In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), reveal a continuing gap between the rhetoric of rehabilitation and its punitive reality. Feld,
supra note 94, at 892. See also Barry Krisberg, et al., The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform,
32 CRIME & DEuNQ. 5, 31-32 (1986) (reporting on cases of abuse in juvenile facilities).
147. Proponents of "law and order" and "get tough" legislation contend that juveniles must
be held more accountable and must be punished for their delinquent acts, especially those of a
violent nature. Feld, supra note 94, at 910 n.428. See also supra note 136.
148. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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Cameron Kocher, to criminal court jurisdiction. Pursuant to the
Juvenile Act, children under ten years old are treated as "dependent"
children who are in need of special care and protective supervision.'
49
Subjecting a child under ten years of age to the jurisdiction of an adult
criminal court would be completely inconsistent with this philosophy of
special care and protection. Moreover, a determination that any child
under the age of ten could not be criminally prosecuted for murder
would comply with national standards.' °
Second, the feasibility of trying a nine-year-old in an adult criminal
court contradicts the benevolent intent of parens patriae. The
possibility that a young child could be convicted of murder in an adult
criminal court would have a potentially devastating effect on that child.
Children who are imprisoned in adult jails face conditions hardly less
oppressive than those that existed in prisons during the nineteenth
century. 5' In addition, states have appeared unable or unwilling to
correct hazardous conditions and remove children completely from adult
jails. 152
The idea that a period of incarceration for a young child who
commits murder will either benefit the offender or have a significant
deterrent effect on other children appears to be without foundation. 15
The best interests of a young child, even one who commits murder, can
hardly be served by such penal sanctions. The reality is that the
adjudication of a nine-year-old who has committed murder should not
be the same as that for a fifteen-year-old who has committed the same
crime. The criminal courts in Pennsylvania must review and consider
more scrupulously the criteria in the Juvenile Act's transfer provision.
VI. Conclusion
Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act offers the most realistic and fair
approach for dealing with children who commit murder. Its transfer
provision allows criminal courts to evaluate a wide range of criteria
when deciding whether there exists some basis for transferring a case
to juvenile court. Despite the heinous nature of the crime of murder
149. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6302, 6351.
150. Winebrake, supra note 123, at 573.
151. For a discussion of the abusive treatment of children in adult jails, see D.B. v.
Tewksbury, 545 F. Supp. 896 (D. Or. 1982); Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Soler, supra note 24, at 190-91,
195-97, 200-01.
152. See Soler, supra note 24, at 191.
153. Shirley M. Hufstedler, Should We Give Up Reform?, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 415, 420
(1984).
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and the potential public demands for punitive sanctions, Pennsylvania
courts must remain focused on the basic goals and philosophy of the
Commonwealth's juvenile justice system. Children, especially younger
children, who commit murder and are amenable to treatment should be
rehabilitated, not .punished. No juvenile justice system is perfect, but
as long as Pennsylvania courts remain faithful to the parens patriae
philosophy of the Juvenile Act, children who commit murder will
hopefully receive the treatment they need and deserve.
Barbara Margaret Farrell

